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3. "Allegedly restrictive policies governing admission to mem-
bership," specifically, the exclusion of mutual funds.43
While this is by no means an exhaustive list of problem areas, it
should serve to emphasize Mr. Cohen's point that congressional ac-
tion is needed to achieve a balance between the antitrust policy of
insuring free and unrestrained competition and the Exchange Act
policy of self-regulation.
CHARLES E. ELROD, JR.
Taxation-Effect of State Court Adjudications in Federal
Tax Litigation
From at least as early as the Supreme Court decision in Freuler
v. Helvering' there has been great uncertainty and even conflict
among the lower federal courts as to the extent to which those
courts, when making determinations of federal tax liability, should
be bound by lower state court adjudications of property rights. In
Freuler the Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that any state
property decision reached in a collusive proceeding be denied con-
clusiveness in regard to federal tax liability. The Commissioner
defined a collusive proceeding as one in which "all the parties joined
in a submission of the issues and sought a decision which would
adversely affect the Government's right to additional ... tax."'2 The
Court neither accepted nor rejected the Commissioner's proposed
test for collusiveness and decided for the taxpayer by upholding
the state decision because of the presence of certain circumstances
which the Court apparently deemed to be controlling.3 By basing its
decision on those circumstances, the Court gave little guidance to
lower courts in the way of general principles to be followed, and its
"' Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
1291 U.S. 35 (1934).
'Id. at 45.
The circumstances were that the case appears to have been initiated
by the filing of a trustee's account, in the usual way. Notice was given
to the interested parties. Objections to the account were presented,
and the matter came on for hearing in due course, all parties being
represented by counsel. The decree purports to decide issues regularly
submitted and not to be in any sense a consent decree.
Id. at 45.
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decision has been criticized for that reason and for being one on
the facts only.4
An example of how this problem manifests itself can be seen
in the recent case of Commissioner v. Bosch,5 where the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a lower state
court decree to be an authorititative determination of the property
rights involved for federal estate tax purposes, even though the
decree was rendered in a proceeding which was clearly nonadversary
and which was brought at least partly for the purpose of affecting
federal estate tax liability. In 1930 Mr. Bosch had created a trust
that granted the income to his wife for life with the remainder to
the settlor or his estate and reserved the right to revoke, alter or
amend. The trust was never revoked and the only alteration oc-
curred in 1931, when Mr. Bosch gave his wife a general power to
appoint the remainder by will. However, in order to prevent inclu-
sion of the trust corpus in her gross estate, Mrs. Bosch in 1951
executed an instrument in which she purported to convert her gen-
eral power of appointment into a special one.' Upon Mr. Bosch's
death in 1957, his executor claimed the marital deduction in the
amount of the value of the trust. The Commissioner asserted a
deficiency in that amount, relying on Mrs. Bosch's release of her
power of appointment. The executor, who was also trustee of the
trust, then filed in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency. While action there was pending, the executor brought
suit in the New York Supreme Court for a settlement of his ac-
count as trustee and for a determination of the validity of Mrs.
Bosch's release of part of her power of appointment. It was con-
ceded that the state proceeding was instituted "at least in part for
the purpose of affecting the outcome" of the case pending in Tax
Court.7 The issue in the lower state court was whether the release
executed by Mrs. Bosch was effective. Three briefs were filed there,
one for Mrs. Bosch, one for the trustee, and the third by a guardian
ad litem for a minor who was a possible beneficiary if Mrs. Bosch
died without exercising her power of appointment. All three briefs
argued that the release was a nullity, and no argument to the con-
" See Comment, 30 U. Cni. L. REv. 569, 570 (1963).
'P-H EsT. & GirT TAxEs (18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 147,003 (2d Cir.
July 6, 1966).
'Id. at 147, 406 n.2.7Id. at 147, 407.
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trary was presented. The New York court held that the purported
release by Mrs. Bosch was a nullity."
The Tax Court, while saying that it was unnecessary for it to
rule that it was bound by the lower decision, nevertheless accepted
the New York ruling "as an authoritative exposition of New York
law and adjudication of the property rights involved," and in so
doing prevented the Commissioner from relitigating the property
issue.' The Tax Court's reasoning was that the New York court
had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the state
proceeding and its judgment was final and conclusive as to those
parties; that although the Supreme Court of New York is a trial
court, its decisions represent legal precedent for courts throughout
the state; that the Commissioner was fully aware of the state pro-
ceeding and could have sought the opportunity to present his views
there; that the New York court rendered a reasoned opinion and
reached a deliberate conclusion;"O and that there appeared to be a
good chance that Mrs. Bosch would exercise her power of appoint-
ment and work an inclusion of the trust corpus in her own estate."1
In affirming, the Second Circuit generally accepted the reasoning of
the Tax Court'2 and cited Sharp v. Commissioner," Blair v. Corn-
8The reasoning of the court here was that since the power of appoint-
ment was testamentary and revocable, it did not come into being until Mr.
Bosch died. Since it was not created until his death, it could not possibly
have been partially released prior to that time. Id. at 147, 407 n.3.
o Herman J. Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964).
' The court added that "although, in our judgment, a more persuasive
case could possibly be made out for the opposite result, there do not appear
to be any contrary decisions and we cannot with confidence say that the
New York court was wrong or that its opinion will not be followed by
other New York courts." Id. at 124.11Id. at 123.
12 The circuit court stated:
The issue is, then, strictly speaking, not whether the federal court
is "bound by" the decision of the state tribunal, but whether or not a
state tribunal has authoritatively determined the rights under state
law of a party to the federal action.... An able Tax Court judge
quite explicitly undertook to balance several relevant factors . . . be-
fore deciding to accept the New York judgment as authoritative of
the rights of the parties. We, too, have considered all of the circum-
stances and feel that the decision below was correct. We hold that
the New York judgment, rendered by a court which had jurisdiction
over parties and subject matter, authoritatively settled the rights of
the parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the
application to those rights of the relevant provisions of federal tax
law.
P-H EsT. & GirT TAXES 147,003, at 147,409-10.1 303 U.S. 624 (1938).
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missioner,14 Freuler, and Gallagher v. Smith'5 as supporting authori-
ties.
In order to view the problem here in a better perspective, it
may be helpful to categorize the cases in this general area of the
law. At least one commentator has suggested the use of three sepa-
rate categories.16 Included in the first are those cases that do not
involve property questions and hold the Treasury is not bound by
local adjudications because the requirements of res judicata were
not fulfilled. Cases in the second category reject local decrees where
Congress has imposed its own criteria of taxability and where again
there are no property questions. The third category includes cases
that turn on the property rights of the litigants, which rights in
turn depend on state law for their determination.Y1 The problem
presented in Freuler and Bosch comes within this final category
where there are no federal criteria and where, either expressly or
by necessary implication, Congress has provided that state law shall
determine the owner of the property right to be taxed.'
Freuler v. Helvering is the leading Supreme Court case that is
concerned with the effect of state property decrees on federal tax
liability, but, as has been pointed out, Freuler provides little guidance
for the lower federal courts in the way of definite guidelines to be
followed in deciding similar cases. The only addition to Freuler
by the Supreme Court came in Blair v. Commissioner.9 There the
Court held that the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court was final
on the issue of whether a spendthrift trust had been created. The
Court also said, "Nor is there any basis for a charge that the suit
was collusive and the decree inoperative,"2 thereby intimating it
would not recognize a decree from a suit it found to be collusive.
Here again, though, the Court offered no definite guidelines with
14300 U.S. 5 (1937).
15223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
"1I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GisT TAXATION 76 (1942); see also
Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal
Tax Litigation, 17 TAx L. Rav. 545, 547 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Braverman & Gerson].
17 "State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue
acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed." Morgan
v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
" "State law may control only when the federal taxing act, by express
language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon
state law." Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
19300 U.S. 5 (1937).
20Id. at 10.
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which the lower courts can operate. As a result, there are vastly
differing views among the lower federal courts as to what consti-
tutes collusion and as to which circumstances will be determinative
in a particular case.
In deciding Bosch, the Second Circuit has apparently adopted
the view taken by the Third Circuit in its leading case of Gallagher
v. Smith,2 which has been consistently followed in that circuit."
In Gallagher the court held that the federal courts were bound by
a decree of a county court as to what the taxpayer's interest was
under a will. This result was reached despite the fact that the pro-
ceedings were of a nonadversary nature.m The court gave sub-
stantial weight to the fact that the local decree was conclusive as
to the litigant's property rights, apparently feeling that there should
be no tax on something not owned under local property law.24 The
Third Circuit rule, then, is that determinations of property issues by
lower state courts will be given conclusive effect in determining
federal tax liability unless the state proceeding is shown to have been
collusive. Although this circuit has not ruled on what, if anything
short of fraud, actually constitutes collusion, it has clearly stated
that mere nonadverseness of the parties in the state proceeding will
not alone be sufficient to warrant a finding of collusion.25 There-
fore, it seems apparent that, in order for the Commissioner to re-
litigate a property issue for tax purposes in the Third Circuit, he
will have to show some form of conduct by the litigants in the state
proceeding that is actually improper. It appears that both the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits are now leaning toward, if not following, the
position taken by the Third Circuit in Gallagher.26
21223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
12 See, e.g., Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962);
Beecher v. United States, 280 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960); Babcock v. Com-
missioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956).23 223 F.2d at 220-21.
21 Id. at 223, 225.
2 Id. at 225.
2 In Nashville Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1943),
the question was whether certain claims against the estate were deductible
for federal estate tax purposes. The local chancery court's decree was that
certain legacies were based on valuable consideration and were not gifts,
and therefore qualified for the deduction. This decree was based on "deposi-
tions which were in no way controverted," yet it was nevertheless held to
be binding on the Tax Court. A more recent case is Old Kent Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 970 (W.D. Mich. 1964), in which
a local probate court's construction of a will was held to be conclusive in
determining federal estate tax liability. Here there was "no active contest
[Vol. 45
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While the rule adopted by the Third Circuit may well be the
easiest to apply to any given case, it does not appear to be the best.
Much of the rationale behind it seems to be found in the hesitancy
of some federal courts to impose tax liability on property rights not
actually owned by the taxpayer under state law. Another reason
frequently mentioned is the failure of the Commissioner to inter-
vene in the state proceeding and present his point of view there.
Still another is that the state court has peculiar knowledge of the
local law and its judgment on local matters must be respected.2T
After all, it is argued that all state judges cannot be assumed to be
"mere puppets in the hands of litigants." 28 Judge Friendly rebuts
this line of reasoning in his dissent29 in Bosch on the grounds that
the view taken by the majority needlessly handicaps the Commis-
sioner in the fair and equal enforcement of the federal revenue laws,
that the state court might have reached the opposite result had the
opposing view been fairly presented," that the state proceeding had
regarding the construction of the decedent's will, but the consents were given
by persons whose financial interests were adverse to those of the widow."
Id. at 978. In the Ninth Circuit two earlier cases had held that "an order
of a state court that adversely affects the tax right of the United States and
which is based upon a nonadversary proceeding does not foreclose the
federal courts from determining the tax liability." Wolfsen v. Smyth, 223
F.2d 111, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1955), Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131,
136 (9th Cir. 1955). However, this position was modified in Flitcroft v.
Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964), in which the court said that
where the only apparent reason for a state decision was its effect on federal
taxation, then this alone would not be enough to prove collusion. The court
distinguished its two earlier holdings by maintaining that in both cases the
state decision "was in fact collusive, was erroneous, and was obtained with-
out notice to the federal tax authorities." Id. at 458.
" Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subse-
quent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAX L. Rnv. 213, 217 (1957).
8 10 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 61.03, at 8 (1964).
29 P-H EsT. & GiFT TAXES 147,003, at 147,410.
8 The controlling statute was N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 183 which
provided:
"Any power which is exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or will, or
otherwise, whether general or special, other than a power in trust
which is imperative, is releasable . . . with respect to the whole or
any part of the property subject to such power and may also be
released in such manner as to reduce or limit the persons or objects,
or classes of persons or objects, in whose favor such power would
otherwise be exercisable."
Judge Friendly pointed out that what appears to be the only
New York case raising the problem in a truly adversary con-
text held that the contingent nature of a power of appoint-
ment.., did not prevent release under § 183, In re Woodcock's
Will, 19 Misc. 2d 268, 186 N.Y.2d 447, 450 (Surr. Ct. West-
chester Co. 1959) .... The sole relevant authority, In re Woodcock's
1966]
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no significant purpose other than the reduction of tax liability, and
that it is standard policy of the Internal Revenue Service not to
intervene in such suits because of insufficient staff, unfamiliarity
with state procedures, and lack of standing to intervene and appeal
without conceding the conclusiveness of the state proceeding which
the Commissioner disputes."1 In addition to Judge Friendly's rea-
sons, it is difficult to understand why these federal courts wish to
protect the taxpayer who goes to state court with the principal pur-
pose of reducing his federal tax liability. If the state decree is a
fair and correct application of state law, the taxpayer should have
nothing to fear from defending his position against that taken by
the Commissioner. Since tax liability in this category depends on
local property rights, it is only equitable that the Government's point
of view be presented when those property rights are adjudicated.32
In view of the present impracticability of the Commissioner's inter-
vening in state court, the only feasible result is that he be given his
day in federal court. Besides, it is too much to assume that the local
judge will consider the Commissioner's arguments when no one has
presented them to the court.33
IAlthough the decisions of the remaining circuit courts lack
needed certainty and tend to be confined to their facts, most of
them have been kinder to the Commissioner's viewpoint. As a gen-
eral proposition, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits will deny conclusive effect to a state decree that was ren-
dered in a proceeding that was nonadversary or collusive.3 4 The
problem here is in ascribing definitive meaning to "nonadversary"
Will, ... was not cited, and the legislative purpose behind § 183 was
not explored.
P-H EsT. & GirT TAXES 147,003, at 147,412-13.
P-H EST. & Girt TAXES 147,003, at 147, 413 n.6.
82 Comment, 30 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 569, 575-76.
"Id. at 578-79.
8
,Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1964); Peyton v.
Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Faulkerson v. United States,
301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962); Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760
(5th Cir. 1958); It re Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.
1956); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955); Saulsbury v.
United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952); Brainard v. Commissioner, 91
F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937); Farish v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.
Tex. 1964). The question appears to be an open one in the First Circuit.
Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st Cir.
1956); Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952); Plunkett v.
Commissioner, 118 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1941); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
United States, 165 F. Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1958).
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and "collusive." These circuit courts have attempted to do so by
denoting certain circumstances that prompt the courts to hold a
state proceeding to be nonadversary or collusive when they are
present in a given case. For example, in Pierpont v. Commission-
er,35 the Fourth Circuit found that the petition upon which the
decree in the lower court36 was based was uncontested and its only
apparent purpose was to obtain a tax advantage, that the examiner-
master failed to make an independent inquiry of the state law in-
volved, and that the lower court failed to do any more than to
rubber stamp the examiner-master's report. On these circumstances
the court found that the state decree was obtained in a proceeding
that was both nonadversary and collusive. 7 Circumstances prompt-
ing the Seven Circuit Court of Appeals to find a state proceeding
nonadversary and non-controlling have been an ex parte proceeding
or a proceeding without notice to anyone, without appearances and
without a hearing on the merits.3 8 Conversely, that circuit has de-
scribed a "proper" case as one which is "adversary and not ex
parte . ..where a hearing was had on the merits . . .where the
question of law has been settled by the appellate courts of the state
or where the judgment of an intermediate court may be fairly ac-
cepted as evidencing the law of the state ... and where the judgment
is not collusive. . ... -3 In Peyton v. Commissioner," the Eighth
Circuit found the local decree to have been collusively obtained on
these circumstances: the state court proceeding was conducted in a
nonadversary atmosphere, there was no notice to federal tax authori-
ties, there was no real opposition to the advocated fee simple, and
the circuit court was persuaded that the state court was wrong in
its determination of state law.
" 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
" Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
"' The court adopted the definition of collusion that was submitted by
the Government in Freuler, that "all the parties joined in a submission of
the issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect the Govern-
ment's right to additional ... tax." In Pitts v. Hamrick,.228 F.2d 486 (4th
Cir. 1955) the court accepted the decree of a South Carolina probate court
as "evidencing the law of the state," especially since there was "no showing
that it was entered as result of collusion or fraud or in a nonadversary pro-
ceeding." Id. at 490.
" Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231, 232 (7th Cir. 1962).
" Id. at 233. The court defined "collusive" as "in the sense that a de-
cision was sought which would adversely affect the Government's right to
additional estate tax." Id. at 232.
" 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
1966]
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Various suggestions have been made on how to reconcile the
differing views among the circuit courts.4 An obvious answer would
be for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in order to clarify
what was said in Freuler and Blair and to pronounce definite guide-
lines to be used by the lower federal courts in dealing with present
and future situations such as are found in Bosch. However, in view
of the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in the past and in con-
sideration of the fact that no legislative solution appears imminent,
it is suggested that the circuit courts attempt to clarify their own
rules and guidelines. Because the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits tend to decide each case on its circumstances
without giving weight to any particular circumstances, it is difficult
to predict how these circuit courts would rule in any particular case.
Still, their view, taken generally, is better than that of the Third
Circuit because of reasons already mentioned and because of the
need to strive for greater uniformity in federal taxation.' What
they need is greater certainty in their general rules regarding non-
adversary and collusive proceedings. This can be done by ascribing
controlling weight to the presence or absence of one or more partic-
ular circumstances. For example, one solution would be to give the
state court adjudication little or no weight when the Commissioner's
argument has not been fairly presented,43 thus allowing him to
relitigate the property issue in federal court. Out of respect for the
state court, its proceeding would be presumed to have been regular,
and the Commissioner would have the burden of proving that its
decision on the property issue was incorrect for purposes of federal
taxation. 4
GEORGE L. LITTLE, JR.
,i See Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 819
(1943); Stephens & Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudica-
tions in Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. REV. 223, 251 (1961).
" As early as 1796 the Supreme Court announced that "the articles taxed
in one state should be taxed in another . . . ." Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 180 (1796). A transfer or property right federally taxed
in state X should not be tax free in state Y just because of the label pinned
on it by the latter state. Consider the following hypothetical example from
Oliver, The Nature of the Complsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax
Proceedings, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 638, 658 n.93 (1953): "What if a state
legislature provides that any power of appointment may be renounced or
disclaimed by the donee any time prior to exercise in his favor and that
a non-exercised power shall be deemed to have been disclaimed or to have
been renounced, rather than lapsed or released?"
"P-H EsT. & GIFT TAxEs 147,003, at 147,411.
"Other suggestions include the following: "Whenever all parties to the
[Vol 45
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state court proceeding approve and have never opposed the proffered result,
and the decree embodying it appears to serve no purpose other than to
avoid federal taxation, the decree should not be regarded as determinative
of the state law property rights purportedly adjudicated." Braverman &
Gerson 576. "If a taxpayer, intending to avoid tax liability, institutes a
state suit, and if no interested party presents the argument urged by the
Commissioner, then the state court judgment should be considered to have
been collusively obtained." Comment, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 581 (1963).
